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Abstract Based on 1978–2007 annual data on crimes recorded by the criminal police
division and through a simultaneous equations model, we have shown that the prob-
ability of apprehension affects negatively the incidence of thefts and homicides as
well as the incidence of aggregate crime. We have also provided evidence that exoge-
nous shocks such as the devaluation of the CFA franc, the military coup d’état, and
the civil war have significantly influenced criminal activity in Abidjan. The civil war
which occurred in Côte d’Ivoire, while driving to a booming of property crimes, has
deterred violent crimes given the crackdown effect of temporary massive presence of
military and paramilitary forces in the streets of the city of Abidjan. In addition, using
a sample of 1,600 households, our inquiry on the likelihood of crime victimization
has pointed out that the risk of being victimized of any kind of crime increases with
the income; the fact of being displaced due to the civil war and the decrease in the
number of police stations in the neighborhood.
Keywords Crime · Enforcement · Devaluation · Political instability · Abidjan
JEL Classification C32 · C35 · H40 · H50 · K42
1 Introduction
Crime has increased dramatically in Côte d’Ivoire during these last decades. As re-
ported by the Criminal Police division, the national crime rate ranged from 5 per
100,000 inhabitants in 1990 to 18 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1998. This trend is ac-
centuated in the large cities which are actually the principal economic development
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poles of the country. The southern area seems to be the most affected by the inci-
dence of crime, mainly the district of Abidjan1 where approximately 40% of aggre-
gate crimes are committed. In this city, the crime rate ranged from 98 per 100,000
inhabitants to 151 per 100,000 inhabitants between 1999 and 2000 reaching even 178
per 100,000 inhabitants in 2001. Crime incidence apparently rose substantially since
the beginning of the political instability, where in 2005 for instance, on the average,
2,558.667 offenses are recorded monthly by the central police station in Abidjan.
This general tendency covers property crimes such as larcenies and car thefts and
violent crimes as well as burglaries, assaults, homicides, armed robberies, and drug
related offenses. Furthermore, the statistics of the national justice department indicate
that property crimes represent more than 76% of the decisions of courts and 80% of
these crimes are violent (Kimou 2001). Additionally, it should be noticed that crime
generates negative external effects.
First of all, crime affects the physical capital assets, which can lead to a low eco-
nomic growth rate (Rubio 1998).2 Likewise, crime deteriorates the human capital
and the accumulation of the human capital (Fajnzylber et al. 1996). Moreover, crime
erodes the social capital (Putnam 1993; Glaeser et al. 1996; Glaeser 1999). Lastly,
the role of the government can be weakened by the persistence of criminality. In-
deed, when citizens entrust their safety to private companies, the government seems
useless and ineffective in supplying the basic public goods (the World Bank 1997).
In summary, crime creates feelings of insecurity, modifies the allowance of property
rights, and causes poverty due to its negative impact on the economic growth.
Likewise, in the view of the Ministry of Internal Security, there is a noticeable
evolution of criminal activity with reference to the means used by criminals. From
simple knives or hand-made weapons, offenders have now passed to more sophisti-
cated firearms. The forms of this type of crime are standard: car thefts, assaults, hold
ups, and terrors on the roads.
In addition, even though the economic situation of Côte d’Ivoire has declined sig-
nificantly since the 1980s, with the fall in the prices of its export products (cocoa and
coffee in particular) and accelerated right after the 1994 CFA devaluation, the eco-
nomic conditions are still critical. The growth rate of the GDP declined constantly
going from 5.7% in 1997 to 4.8% in 1998 and from 1.6% in 1999 to 1.2% in 2002
(Azam and Koidou 2002).
This harmful economic situation contributed to the degradation of the living con-
ditions of the population of Côte d’Ivoire in general and especially of people living
in the district of Abidjan.3 This period is also that of an unprecedented political vi-
olence with the first military coup in December 1999 and the beginning of the civil
war in 2002.
1Around 4 million people live in Abidjan city out of a total population estimated to nearly 18 million
inhabitants.
2Rubio (1998) showed that due to homicide augmentation, capital accumulation in Colombia felt about
38% of the level it should reach. The World Bank (1997) also indicated that tourism stagnation in many
Latin American countries is due to lack of investment in hostelry and tourism infrastructures because of
the rise of criminal activity.
3According to Roubaud (2003), 44% of the households living in Abidjan city assert to live harshly with
the income they earn.
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This paper backs up the economics of crime and sociological theories of lifestyle
exposure and routine activities to argue that political instability, economic conditions,
and enforcement policies significantly affect the prevalence of serious criminal activ-
ities in the main development pole of Côte d’Ivoire.
The main purpose of the paper is to find out the main socio-economic factors
that affect the incidence of urban crime in the city of Abidjan. To limit the scope
of the paper, we focus on the deterrent effect of the police resource in preventing
crime while controlling for the role of income through the incidence of 1994 CFA
devaluation, and some exogenous shocks such as the first military coup d’état and the
civil war.
Combining both a simultaneous equations modeling of the supply for offenses
and a crime victimization analysis, we show on the one hand that the 1994 CFA
devaluation led to the booming of aggravated assaults (income effect) may be due
to an improving economic condition, while victimization is significantly associated
with income and the area of residence. On the other hand, except for aggravated
assaults, we found a deterrent effect of police resources and of a crackdown effect of
the civil war on violent crime due to a massive patrols of well-equipped military and
paramilitary forces during the political unrest.
The remaining of this paper is as follows: Sect. 2 presents the literature review,
in Sect. 3, we present the data and an overview of criminal activities, in Sect. 4, we
describe the empirical strategy, and Sect. 5 summarizes the main empirical findings
before suggesting some policy implications in our concluding remarks.
2 Literature review
Since the seminal article of Becker (1968) extended by Ehrlich (1973, 1996), the
offender is considered as an agent facing a choice problem given the direct cost, the
opportunity cost, and expected return from the offense. From that perspective, empiri-
cal research has in general confirmed the theoretical conclusions of the Becker–Erlich
model, indicating the negative relationship between the amount of crime and deter-
rence tools on the one hand and the improvement from the socioeconomic conditions
on the other hand.
For Ehrlich (1973), the probability that an individual enters illegal activity can be
described by a whole of explanatory variables including the probability of detection
and the severity of the punishment. Using a Cobb–Douglas deterrence production
function, and a simultaneous equations model, the author shows that the rate of all
the types of crime is conversely and significantly tied to the probability of detection
and to the related punishment level. He also concludes that the productivity of deter-
rence actions is negatively influenced by the size and the density of the population
and positively affected by the extent of poverty, and the level of education of the
adult population. These results reinforce the idea that potential criminals respond to
incentives.
In the developing countries and especially in Africa, the study of the motivations
of the crime was especially directed toward the role of the inequalities and poverty.
This analysis is carried out either with primary data, i.e., the case of Miguel (2005)
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in the analysis of violence toward the people of third age in Tanzania or with cross
section as in Demombynes and Özler (2005) which showed that the inequality and
poverty positively influence criminality in South Africa.
In the same way, using a random Poisson process, Fafchamps and Minten (2005)
showed that burglaries and the robbery of agricultural goods increase with poverty
in rural Madagascar. According to them, the situation was driven from the political
crisis due to the needs to maintain their living standard which grew worse because of
an exogenous shock.
One of the problems in the analysis of criminal behavior is that crime is not di-
rectly observable. In spite of this difficulty, Fafchamps and Minten (2005) and Roché
(2005) used self-reported data to analyze the determinants of delinquency of young-
sters, respectively, in the United States of America and in France. However, undertak-
ing such a study requires not only a good amount of confidentiality and voluntaries,
but also a long period to conquer individuals’ confidence. Such an approach is possi-
ble with the age of the target population which is primarily made up of young high
school pupils whereas the same step toward the adult population is likely not to pro-
vide satisfactory results.
Kalb and Williams (2001) circumvented this difficulty by carrying out a retrospec-
tive investigation. Here, the criminal characteristics of the individuals are identified
previously before the interview. Consequently, one avoids during the consultation to
ask to the respondent questions about their propensities with delinquency.
This kind of initiative is appropriate for the developed world where the economic
structures and the materials of the police force make it possible to have information
on each citizen. Moreover, the dependent variable is the experiment of arrest of the
individual, but we do not have any information on the type of committed crime. It
is probably one of the reasons for which the majority of the empirical results come
from regressions based on reported crime data.
Nevertheless, two major problems appear with aggregate reported data of the
crime: the issue of endogeneity and that of underreporting of criminal statistics. In
addition, even though they do not provide information on the individual characteris-
tics of offenders, official data have the advantage of providing broad information on
the prevalence of the phenomenon in a given community. Furthermore, reported sta-
tistics make it possible to have a long series which are indeed invaluable to highlight
changes of regulation of the criminal phenomenon (Lagrange 2001).
In the same way, the quality of crime data very often do not permit to control
simultaneously the impact of both economic variables and deterrence instruments.
Primary data do provide information on the profile of offenders, their income, and
their employment status, but do not inform on the incidence of deterrence policies
(Corman and Mocan 2005).
Hence, another approach to question the determinants of crime require to analyze
the vulnerability to the phenomenon for several reasons. Analyzing crime victimiza-
tion helps to better identify the exposed population and to propose a suitable crime
prevention policy. The investigations on crime victimization are the most exact instru-
ments to appreciate the incidence of the phenomenon, mainly in developing countries
where underreporting is very important (Gaviria and Pages 2002).
Even though the examination of crime victimization has been often undergone
in developed countries such as France (Fougère et al. 2007) that approach seems
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more appropriate for the developing countries because of the statistical weaknesses.
In Latin America, the question is of interest (Gaviria and Pages 2002; Fajnzylber et
al. 2001 and Gomes and Paz 2005). In Africa, some recent works have addressed the
issue. We have, for instance, a research in Mozambique (Barslund et al. 2007) and
another one in South Africa (Powdthavee 2005).
Using the sociological theory of “life-style exposure perspective” (Hindelang et al.
1978)4 and that of the “routine activity perspective” (Cohen et al. 1981),5 Barslund
et al. (2007) found on the one hand that individuals living in a larger household size
have less probability to be a victim of crime due to an intra-household protection
network and on the other hand that the share of adults provides a significant negative
effect on the probability of being victim of crime.
The combination of the two approaches would be advantageous in the apprehen-
sion of criminality in the district of Abidjan. In fact, a times series analysis helps to
consider trend of the phenomenon whilst inquiry on victimization spells out people
who are likely to be vulnerable.
3 Data and overview of criminal activities
This paper uses both reported crime data and victimization survey conducted in the
district of Abidjan. This section describes incidence of crime in the light of the two
sets of data used in our empirical investigation.
3.1 Reported crime data
The data are from several sources and are related to both criminal statistics and to the
socio-economic influences.
The data on crime are collected from the department of statistics of the Criminal
Police Division. These statistics do not provide detailed information on assaults, vio-
lence and threats, law abidingness, in particular, the financial delinquency and drugs
enforcement.
However, the main categories of crimes whose definition remains stable and able
to reveal the critical trends of delinquency and crime are recorded. Therefore, we
collected annual reports on crime committed in the district of Abidjan from 1978 to
2007. These series are related to homicides, armed robberies or aggravated assaults,
burglaries, or thefts and illegal holding of firearms.
These data come primarily from all injuries known by the Criminal Police Divi-
sion. They also encompass the number of arrests per type of offense. The Criminal
Police Division is the main department of the national police to provide credible and
4The theory of lifestyle suggests that differences in the probability of being victim of crime can be ex-
plained by differences in the lifestyles of the potential victims.
5Quite similar to the lifestyle perspective, the theory of the routine activity perspective argues that non-
household activities increase the probability of victimization by making the individual more visible and
accessible to potential criminals.
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Chart 1 Rate of aggravated assaults and illegal possession of firearms from 1978 to 2007
reliable statistics on illegal activities in the district of Abidjan. Their office of Abid-
jan records mostly the volume of crimes committed on the territory of the district of
Abidjan.
The other data we consider in this study are those related to the socio-economic
environment on crime such as inequality, demography, and police action. Data relat-
ing to public expenses devoted to security are from the Ministry of Finances.
The population size and the Gini inequality index data for the district of Abidjan
are provided by censuses and surveys on living standards held by the National Insti-
tute of Statistics (INS), which is a reference in the provision of such data relating to
Côte d’Ivoire.
The trend of aggregate crime rate in Abidjan is dominated by the prevalence of vi-
olent offenses. In Abidjan city, violent crimes refer to murders and armed robberies or
aggravated assaults. Violent crimes account for more than three-quarters of aggregate
crimes, reflecting therefore the widespread feeling of insecurity among urbanites.
As shown in Chart 1, the trend of violent crimes seems positively correlated to that
of illegal possession of firearms in the first sub-period (the peak). That phenomenon
could be related to excessive circulation of light weapons during the civil war in
the neighboring countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, the apparent
absence of correlation between the slope of the trend of violent crimes and that of
illegal firearms after 1989 (Chart 1) does not mean that the political instability in
Côte d’Ivoire has not affected the severity of violent crimes. In fact, as indicated in
Table 1, on the average, the incidence of aggravated assaults and homicides is higher
during the political instability period (1999–2007) than any other period.
In summary, between 1978 and 2007, the average crime rate is relatively very high
for each series of crime. However, during the socio-political instability period there
is apparently a booming in criminal activities and incidence of offenses seems mostly
dominated by violent crimes.
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Table 1 Summary statistics: Incidence of crime in the district of Abidjan from 1978 to 2007
Variables Entire period First sub-period Second sub-period Third sub-period
(1978–2007) (1978–1988) (1989–1998) (1999–2007)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Homicides 52 31.36 26.90 25.45 71.55 16.89 66.77 28.15
Aggravated Assaults 1,807.1 1,662.7 375.72 282.24 1,971.44 1,246.66 3567 1,314.31
Illegal firearms 38.83 23.04 38 28.04 54.33 19.67 26.66 7.88
Thefts or burglaries 187.7 233.88 106.81 79.75 72 38.77 416.66 322.03
Aggregate crime 2,269.43 2,106.42 525.9 275.84 1,933.33 1,112.49 4,951.88 1,371.07
Table 2 Pairwise correlation: illegal firearms and crimes
Variables Entire period First sub-period Second sub-period Third sub-period
(1978–2007) (1978–1989) (1990–1998) (1999–2007)
Illegal firearm Illegal firearms Illegal firearms Illegal firearms
Homicides 0.5210** 0.6868** −0.324 −0.4033
Aggravated Assaults −0.0881 0.8481** −0.0928 −0.2132
Theft 0.0583 0.5118 −0.2395 0.4892
Aggregate crimes −0.1311 0.9715** −0.1905 −0.0763
**Denotes significance at 5% level
However, this pre-eminence of violent crimes does not mean that property crimes
are minimal. This situation would reflect rather the problem of underreporting of
official crime data. The United Nations Program for Development (UNDP, 2001) has
shown that in Abidjan city, people are more prone to complain about crime when
there is a physical attempt or when their properties are violently uprooted.
Moreover, according to Fajnzylber et al. (2001), since people are not indifferent to
a corpse, police officers are quickly alerted in case of homicides, armed robberies, or
aggravated assaults whilst the propensity to declare thefts or larcenies are minimal.
The pairwise correlation analysis (see Table 2) allows understanding of what kind
of crime relates to each other. For instance, that approach could provide some evi-
dence on the relationship between the illegal holding of guns and other types of crime
on the one hand, and on the second hand help to test the degree of that correlation
across periods.
The pairwise correlation analysis shows that the illegal circulation of firearms is
positively and significantly correlated to murders, aggravated assaults, and aggregate
crime in the first sub-period characterized by civil conflict in neighboring countries.
In addition, during the entire period that positive correlation still holds, but only for
homicides. That result suggests that violent crimes are very sensitive to the circulation
of light weapons, precisely in a conflict era.
Nonetheless, there is no correlation between the illegal possession of firearms and
crime in the second and third sub-periods. Such a result could highlight the prob-
lem of underreporting of official statistics related to crime. In fact, data reported on
firearms occur mostly during police operations and often do not emanate from com-
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plaints from the victims of property or violent crimes. Such a result suggests that
offenses on weapons are not correlated to other offenses, which is likely to be far
from reality.
3.2 Victimization data
Victimization data are from a survey undertaken by the Observatory of Public Opin-
ion on Democracy and on Human Rights (ODDH).6 This survey was carried out from
October to November 2006 under the technical supervision of the National Institute
of Statistics (INS). It has covered the city of Abidjan and has focused on a sample of
1,700 households randomly selected. The interview has targeted mainly the heads of
household and households’ members above 12 years of age. The data collection was
conducted in nine of the ten municipalities of the city of Abidjan.
Even though these data7 are not drawn from a purposely conducted crime vic-
timization survey, still a section of the questionnaire referred to important inquiries
relating to the exposure to crime. Indeed that section offered detailed information on
victims of larcenies, burglaries, assaults, and other forms of offenses such as harass-
ment, bribery, sexual abuse, and physical and verbal attempts. The questionnaire had
also reported useful information on the experience with enforcement of the public se-
curity including, feeling of protection by the State, appreciation of police and justice
services, and trust to the criminal system.
The database also encompasses individual and household characteristics and var-
ious household’s expenditures such as recurrent and dated expenses relating to ed-
ucation, clothing, leisure, funeral, and remittances toward relatives. Due to missing
information, data processing has permitted to exclude 100 households and identify a
final sample of 1,600 households and 6,446 individuals. However, only information
on household heads has been made available to us, so our database comprises 1,600
observations.
To investigate the determinant of crime victimization, other data at the community
level have been also collected. These are the density of the population of a given
municipality, the number of police stations in the municipality, and the distance to the
nearest police station. The demographic data are those of 2002 from the projection of
INS based on the 1998 general census. The number of police stations is provided by
the Ministry of Home Affairs.
As far as the distance to the nearest police station is concerned, individuals have
not reported during the interview the average length they walk to reach the nearest
police station. Therefore, we could not get that information from our sample. To over-
come that difficulty, using the maps of the clusters of enumeration areas from which
the 1,600 households have been selected, the Department of Cartography of the INS
has estimated the average distance to the nearest police station. This procedure helped
to associate each household with its average distance to the nearest police station.
Data collected from ODDH show that men are more concerned with security is-
sues than women (51%), but both men and women believe that security (19%) is the
6Project established in CIRES with the financial support of European Union.
7The survey focused on democracy, political, and social governance prospects.
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Table 3 Comparison: reported crime and survey victimization in 2006
Victimization rate from the Reported crime rate in 2006
survey (%) (per 100,000 people)
Assault 14.18 1,813
Larceny or Burglary 16.00 564
Aggregate crime 33.31 2,889
third public good to be provided by the State after justice (48%) and health services
(37%).
In addition, 33.3% of household heads have reported having been victim of a crime
and 42.6% of whom have asserted being victim of assaults while others claimed to
have paid bribes or have been a victim of sexual abuse, harassment, or other type of
crime. In addition, nearly 80% of victims are men and 52.5% of individuals surveyed
believe feeling unsafe in Abidjan.
One of the important contributions of the analysis of victimization is the fact that
it helps to tackle the real criminal situation in the developing world. Actually, while
the victimization rate from the survey is about 33%, the criminal police division has
reported 2,889 offenses per 100,000 in the city of Abidjan (see Table 3). This un-
derreporting issue is more pronounced for property crimes such as larcenies and bur-
glaries as shown in Table 3. In fact, in 2006, only 564 thefts (including larcenies and
burglaries) for 100,000 people were officially known, while the survey points out a
victimization rate of 16%.
4 Empirical strategy
This body of the study presents the economic theory of criminal behavior that sustains
our investigation and its resulting econometric modeling.
4.1 Estimating the supply for offense
The formalization is based on Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973, 1996).
Under the assumption of rationality, a person i willing to engage in a particular
crime is motivated by the following:
– the expected illegitimate payoff per offense (that is the probability of not being
apprehended (1 − pi) times the loot (bi)),
– the direct cost endured by the offender to get the loot (ci ),
– the opportunity cost, i.e., the lost of alternative legal wage (w),
– the subjective probability of apprehension (pi), the eventual penalty if convicted
(fi),
– and the moral values and the preference for risk.
Assuming that the individual is risk neutral and pursues only one illegal activity, his
expected advantage from a crime (πi) can be written as
πi = (1 − pi) × bi − ci − wi − pi × fi. (1)
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For an individual having some “moral” values, the net advantage of a crime would
have to exceed a certain threshold (m), to which he can assign pecuniary value, before
the individual commits a crime.
Let d represent the decision to commit an offense (d = 1) or not (d = 0); the
potential criminal’s behavior is then cleared by
d = 1 if πi ≥ mi,
d = 0 if πi ≤ mi. (2)
This simple formalization of an individual’s criminal behavior helps to understand
the different flows of the aggregated crime level in the society. In fact, it is possible
to capture the reaction of the population vis-à-vis legitimate and illegitimate oppor-
tunities given the economic performance and the distribution of moral values in the
community.
Therefore, if the distribution of moral values is well defined, the individual’s
amount of offenses (qi), will be an increasing function of the net advantage of crime.
That is the number of offenses supplied by the individual i, (si) is then
qi = si(πi), with s′i (πi) ≥ 0. (3)
Since crime is comprised of discrete actions, the dependent variable could generally
be specified in terms of directly observable number of offenses one commits qi what
leads to this behavioral function:




Expression (4) indicates that the quantity of committed felonies by a person is a
decreasing function of the probability of detection (pi) and the level of punishment
(fi).
This quantity is also explained by other variables (ui) but the sense of causality is
to be found. At an aggregate level, the behavioral function could also be regarded as
a collective offense supply function in a given period of time, that is,
Q = Ψ (P,F,U), (5)
where P , F , and U are the average level of pi , fi , and ui , and where Q is the total
sum of a given offense i. Also, the crime rate or the supply for offense per capita is a
function of the same variables.






= Pβ1t F β2t I β3t Eβ4t Dβ5t . (6)
Assuming that taste for crime may be either proportional to some quantifiable vari-
ables or uncorrelated in the natural logarithm with all explanatory variables (Ehrlich






= γP β1t F β2t I β3t Eβ4t Dβ5t exp(μ). (6′)
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= α + β1 ln(Pt ) + β2 ln(Ft ) + β3 ln(Et ) + β4 ln(I ) + β5Dt + μt
with α = ln(γ ), (7)
where α is a constant and μ stands for random errors of measurement other stochastic
effects and is assumed to have a normal distribution. (O/N)t denotes the crime rate,
P is the average probability of detection, F measures the average of sentence length,
I refers to income inequality, E represents the average income level, and D the year
dummy taking into seasonality and other social shocks.
Though police action is the concrete manifestation of public deterrence policy, the
number of police officers to be enrolled is not only related to the intensity of criminal
activity, but also to the economic conditions. For that reason, following Henderson








Since the probability of detection, and thus the number of police officers (P ) is an
increasing function of public expenses (G) and a decreasing function of the crime
rate (O/N), we estimate and assume that: λ1 ≥ 0 and λ2 ≤ 0, with Z denoting other
non- measurable influences of criminal behavior. A linear transformation of (8) leads
to the second equation to be estimated:







+ λ3 ln(density)+ λ4 ln(Pt−1)+ ξt , (8′)
where G indicates the public expenditures devoted to the criminal justice system,
density designates the density of the population, and Pt−1, the lagged value of the
probability of apprehension.
To sum up, our simultaneous equations model which has been estimated is com-







= β0 + β1 ln(Pt ) + β2 ln(Ft ) + β3 ln(Et ) + β4 ln(It ) + β5Dt + μt ,







+ λ3 ln(density) + λ4 ln(Pt−1) + ξt .
Our explained variable is the crime rate. For a given offense, crime rate is measured
by the total number of reported crimes by a fraction of 100,000 inhabitants, that is,
(crime rate)t = number of offensesTotal population × 100,000.
Four series of crimes are analyzed in our study. Those are aggregate crime, aggravated
assaults, homicides and thefts, or burglaries. The control and explanatory covariates
of our model are:
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– Inequality is captured by the Gini concentration index. The Gini index measures
the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households
deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A high index therefore suggests an
increase in inequality, which is likely to lead to a serious crime incidence in terms
of a means of survival. We test the hypothesis that a rising inequality positively
affects crime, mainly property crimes.
– Instability, political violence, and civil war is captured by two dummy variables
taking into account seasonality. One addresses the impact of the military coup
and the other one measures the consequences of the civil war. The military coup
dummy is 1 for the period after 1999 and 0, otherwise and lastly, the civil war
dummy takes 1 for the period after 2002 and 0, otherwise.
– Illegal firearms: this variable is added in order to take into account the flows of
light weapons as potential explanation of serious crime in a conflict context. It is
expected that an increase in the rate of illegal possession of firearms should raise
criminal activity.
– The population size is also an important determinant of crime. It is expected that
crime be negatively related to the size of the population.
– Income: the effect of income is captured by the devaluation year dummy which
takes the value of 1 for all periods after 1994 and 0, otherwise. Under the hy-
pothesis that the channel trough which the 1994 CFA devaluation affect crimes
is through its effect on income, the expected relationship between that variable
and the urban crime rate is ambiguous. Indeed, the effect of 1994 CFA deval-
uation on urban incomes was itself mixed, with some households gaining and
others losing.
– The probability of detection is captured by the number of police per capita. How-
ever, in the context of crisis the country is facing, data on police resources in Côte
d’Ivoire is challenging. It is true that the physical presence of an extra policeman
increases the likelihood of arrest when a criminal commits his act. Similarly, the
increase in the number of police officers will raise investigation resources devoted
to address and arrest the perpetrators of a crime after their act (Swimmer 1974).
Following Ehrlich (1973), for a given crime, the probability of apprehension and con-
viction can be captured by the number of criminals arrested and brought to the total
number of crimes recorded by police. A good proxy for the probability of detection
is obtained by dividing the number of perpetrators apprehended by the total number
of crimes reported. An increase in the probability of detection should alter the level
of criminal activity.
For our simultaneous equations model of crime to be identified, the number of
instruments in the model needs to exceed the number of endogenous covariates. For
this purpose, we have chosen three instruments which are:
– Public expenditures, measured by the proportion of annual expenditures devoted to
internal security (police and gendarmerie) in the special budget for investment. An
increase of that proportion is expected to reduce the volume of criminal activity in
Abidjan through its impact on the probability of apprehension.
– The density of the population which is also used as an instrument to the probability
of apprehension, since the density may also be negatively related to the probability
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of apprehension because of the ease with which an offender could elude the police
in a densely populated area (Ehrlich 1973).
– Lagged probability of apprehension: according to Kpodar (2007), a lagged value
of the endogeneous explanatory variable is a good instrument of that variable. We
have therefore used lagged probability of apprehension as an additional instrument.
4.2 Estimating likelihood of victimization
Following Barslund et al. (2007), we postulate that the probability that an individual
be exposed to a given crime exhibits the reduced form as follows:
Pr(yic = 1|xic, zc) = f (xic, zc, εic), (9)
where yic is a variable indicating whether the household head i living in area c is a
victim of a crime. The dependent variable takes the value one if the individual has
been victim of a crime and zero, otherwise; xic and zc are respectively individual
characteristics of the household head and the municipality where it lives, and εic is
an individual error term. Assuming that the error term is normally distributed, rela-
tion (9) can be estimated through a probit model. The appropriate regression approach
for such a discrete choice model is the maximum likelihood method.
Besides usual individual socio-economic characteristics, to take into account the
role of social interactions in exposure to crime, the definition of our explanatory vari-
ables also referred to the sociological theories of lifestyle defined by Hindelang et al.
(1978) and that of routine activities of Cohen et al. (1981).
The theory of lifestyle suggests that individuals who are young, male, single, and
have low income levels have a higher risk of being a victim of crime because they
are more active in the public domain, use less time inside the family, and are often
associated with persons exhibiting criminal tendencies.
The theory of routine activities is quite similar to that of lifestyle, but permits in
addition to capture the differences in the risk of victimization among social groups.
Following Barslund et al. (2007), we have defined our explanatory variables in the
light of both economic and sociological theories of crime. Thus, we have built five
major categories of variables relating to exposure, guardianship, proximity, attraction,
and community.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Results for supply for offenses
Before estimating our model of supply for an offense, several specification tests have
been conducted. These are the normality test, the error specification test, the endo-
geneity test for the explanatory variable, i.e., the probability of apprehension, and
the heteroskedasticity test (see the Appendix). These tests show that our model of
supply for an offense is well specified (see Table 9), with normality distribution of
the error term (see Table 10) and a constant variance (see Table 11), and that the
model does exhibit an endogenous covariate (see Table 8). Also, there may be other
926 J.C.A. Kimou
endogeneity issues in the explanatory variables. One is ‘illegal firearms’. Since we do
not have instruments for “illegal firearms” to conduct a specific endogeneity test, we
have checked through a causality test whether that independent variable is correlated
with the residual. In such a context, this would suggest that the variable of interest
is endogenous. The test has been conducted for each type of crime as indicated in
Table 13; showing that “illegal firearms” is not significantly related to the residual;
therefore, we may consider it as an exogenous explanatory variable. The supply for
an offense model has been estimated using ordinary and two-stage least squares. The
results are presented in Tables 4 and 5.
Since the probability of arrest is a key variable for crime enforcement, following
Swimmer (1974), we have compared the coefficient of the probability of arrest in the
OLS and 2SLS regressions (see Table 6). As indicated in Table 6, with the excep-
tion of aggravated assaults, two-stage least squares alters the regression estimate of
the probability of arrest. Incidence of homicide, thefts, and aggregate crime which
are inversely correlated to the probability of arrest in both OLS and 2SLS regres-
sion, have respectively a significant coefficient lower 7.6%, 2.4%, and 6.3% with the
simultaneous equation estimates. Furthermore, not only the OLS regression overesti-
mate the probability of arrest, but the values of the R-squared for each type of crime,
indicating goodness of fit, are better in the simultaneous regressions than in the OLS
ones. From these observations, the results of 2SLS appear as a valid estimate of the
supply for an offense. Also, our simultaneous equation of supply for an offense ex-
hibit three instruments for the unique endogenous covariate, indicating that the model
is overidentified. The following comments are based upon the two stages estimate.
5.1.1 Impact of the socio economic covariates
The socio-economic variables are inequality and population size. Inequality mea-
sured by the Gini concentration index is not significant for whatever crime aspect is
considered as a dependent variable, except for thefts. That result seems consistent
with that of Powdthavee (2005) in South Africa, where crime, mainly property crime
is found to be positively associated with inequality. However, the population size neg-
atively affects all the series of offenses. This is consistent to many empirical findings
like that of Ehrlich (1973) and Fafchamps and Minten (2005), where the size of the
population is found to prevent crime.
5.1.2 The effect of illegal firearms
We expected a booming impact of illegal firearms on criminal activities. That assump-
tion has been validated only for aggravated assaults. We found a positive and signif-
icant relationship between assaults and illegal light weapons. That result is rather of
common sense, since most of assaults are undertaken under the threat of firearms.
5.1.3 The effect of enforcement tools
A policy to discourage crime should be related to negative incentives to engage in
illegal occupation. These types of incentives are captured by the probability of arrest.
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Table 6 Percentage difference between ordinary least squares and two stage least squares in estimating
the probability of arrest
Log of Crime Rate Supply of crime Equations
OLS Estimate 2SLS Estimate Percentage Underestimatea
Thefts −0.36∗∗ −0.39∗ 7.6
Aggravated assaults −0.11 −0.12 –
Homicides −0.81∗∗ −0.83∗∗ 2.4
Aggregate crime −1.89∗∗∗ −1.95∗∗∗ 6.3
aPercent difference = (bOLS-b2SLS)/|b2SLS|
There is a negative and significant incidence of the probability of apprehension on
thefts, homicides, and aggregate crime. That finding is in accordance with the theory
of crime and in most of the empirical results in the literature. It is a confirmation
of the Becker–Erlich paradigm. However, although inversely associated with aggra-
vated assaults, we found no significant deterrent impact of police resources on that
type of crime. That situation may rather be related to the ineffectiveness of police
actions given corruption in the police force. Meanwhile, from a static comparative
perspective, our results suggest that any increase in the probability of arrest of 10%,
ceteris paribus, should drive to a decrease in the incidence of thefts, homicides, and
aggregate crimes, respectively, of 3.9%, 8.3%, and 9.5%.
Several exogenous shocks occurred during these last decades in Côte d’Ivoire,
namely, the devaluation of the regional currency (FCFA) in 1994, the military coup
d’état in 1999, and the civil war in 2002. We would like to check whether these events
have driven to a boom of criminal activity in the city of Abidjan. For that purpose,
a Chow stability test has been carried out for the years 1994, 1999, and 2002. The
probabilities of that test for each type of crime (see Table 12 in the Appendix) imply
rejection of the null hypothesis of stability of the coefficient between the different
subgroups of interest. The effect of these shocks is captured by the different year
dummies in each individual crime.
As far as is devaluation concerned Even though Côte d’Ivoire’s economic growth
rate was declining during the decade prior to the devaluation, growth rate of the GDP
accelerated right after the 1994 CFA devaluation. Furthermore, due to the positive
impact of the 1994 CFA devaluation on economic growth both in Ivorian rural and
urban areas, at the margin, urban workers should have more disposable income than
before that economic shock. Also, the effect of the 1994 CFA devaluation on urban
incomes was itself ambiguous, with some households gaining and others losing.
Finally, if one takes into account only the income effect of devaluation, its impacts
on crime should be ambiguous referring to the economic motivation to turn to crim-
inal activities. Therefore, our findings indicate that the devaluation of the CFA franc
in 1994, has not significantly affected the different series of crimes except aggra-
vated assaults for which the impact is positive and significant. The income effect of
devaluation on aggravated assaults may exhibit the idea that any increase in income
consecutive to the 1994 CFA devaluation, increases the expected return from crime,
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what could motivate criminal activities, since there is not a significant deterrent im-
pact of police action on that particular type of crime. Furthermore, that phenomenon
could be tied to the loss of purchase power of some urbanites who might turn to illegal
occupations.
Concerning the military coup d’état We show that the military coup d’état has in-
duced an increase in criminal activities in Abidjan. We found a positive and signif-
icant relationship between the 1999 dummy and the rate of aggravated assaults and
aggregate crime rate. The coup d’état occurred in a context of political unrest and re-
current social demonstrations. That situation has been worsened during the military
transition, with a tougher economic condition, a weak state, and an increase in the
illegal possession of firearms. Even though the military power tried to implement an
extra judiciary policing of crime, protests from international human rights organiza-
tion, altered their intent to really deter violent crimes.
In reference to the civil war Our findings show that the civil conflict has affected
both property and violent crimes. In reverse to the military coup d’état effect, we
found a negative and significant impact of the civil war on the incidence of homi-
cides and aggravated assaults. That result shows that the civil war has caused a se-
rious drop in violent crime. In fact, during the civil war, Abidjan has been the main
target of rebel groups, the district has been well protected, and government forces in
that area were relatively important and well equipped. The city has also experienced
repeated curfews and there was a massive presence of police, paramilitary, and mil-
itary forces in the streets. Since assaults and murders are sensible to the presence of
police resources, that situation which may have increased temporarily the probability
of detection, led to a reduction in violent offenses. That result is in accordance with
Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) who found that a temporary massive presence of
police officers in a block of Buenos Aires after a terrorist attack in Argentina has
reduced significantly the incidence of car thefts. Therefore, the crackdown effect of
military forces during the civil conflict may have deterred major crimes such as armed
robberies in Abidjan.
However, the positive relationship between larcenies or thefts and the civil war
dummy indicates a booming of that sort of offenses during that period of poor eco-
nomic conditions. Even though most assaults are economically motivated, property
crimes are not as sensitive to the presence of police as are violent crimes, rather they
seem more influenced by economic conditions. Our finding therefore seems consis-
tent with that of Fafchamps and Minten (2005), who have found that the political
crisis in Madagascar led to a booming of property crimes, namely theft of agricul-
tural goods.
5.2 Results for crime victimization
Table 7 shows the main results of our econometric regression of an instrumented
variable probit model of crime victimization. The figures in brackets are the robust
standard deviations. The average distance to the nearest police stations and the lo-
cal density of the population are used as instruments for number of police stations.
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Table 7 Instrumented variables probit results
Variable Victim Thefts Assault
Coefficient t-Stats Coefficient t-Stats Coefficient t-Stats
(std error) (std error) (std error)
Single 0.2760∗ 1.86 0.1898324 1.13 0.25964 1.46
(0.148) (0.168256) (0.1775)
Married 0.0929∗ 0.72 0.2346945 1.51 0.04518 0.30
(0.1296) (0.155000) (0.15048)
Densely neighborhood 0.12101 1.56 0.157877∗ 1.75 0.08378 0.92
(0.077) (0.090141) (0.0910)
Residential neighborhood 0.3484∗ 2.64 0.2044689∗ 1.66 0.3019∗∗ 1.99
(0.1317) (0.1234673) (0.1514)
HH adult members 0.0024 1.38 −0.0001923 −0.10 0.003522∗ 1.73
(0.001) (0.0018628) (0.0020)
Gender: male 0.072 0.65 0.285729∗∗ 2.32 −0.0915 −0.69
(0.111) (0.1229369) (0.1334)
Age 0.0590 0.13 0.0095236 0.92 −0.1763 −0.34
(0.453) (0.010357) (0.5172)
Age squared −8.4e-6 −0.08 −0.000122 −0.98 0.00007 0.58
(0.000) (0.000124) (0.00013)
Displaced due to war 0.3278∗ 2.67 0.480414∗∗∗ 3.93 −0.10422 3.93
(0.122) (0.1221011) (0.1398)
Primary Education 0.1212 1.08 −0.0949984 −0.72 0.185514 1.41
(0.112) (0.1316353) (0.131693)
Secondary Education 0.315∗∗ 3.23 0.1527133 1.38 0.25174∗∗ 2.20
(0.097) (0.1104621) (0.114641)
Higher Education 0.312∗∗ 2.80 0.1354429 1.09 0.26674∗∗ 2.04
(0.111) (0.1237813) (0.130649)
Income per capita 0.0505∗ 1.65 −8.59e-08∗ −1.68 0.19831∗∗ 1.97
(0.030) (5.12e-08) (0.100677)
Employed in a paid job −0.1142 −1.21 −0.0866568 −0.77 0.0242159 0.22
(0.094) (0.1119281) (0.111988)
Self-employed 0.1924∗ 1.87 0.1204503 1.04 0.208375∗ 1.70
(0.103) (0.1157601) (0.12222)
Number of police stations −0.656∗ −2.71 0.0859091 1.00 −0.66708∗∗ −2.37
(0.242) (0.0860755) (0.280925)
Household size −0.0643 −0.92 0.0080317 0.60 −0.013104 −0.99
0.0702 (0.0133443) 0.0132316
Observations 1,600 1,600 1,600
Wald chi2(17) 59.73 42.63 33.87
Log pseudolikelihood −1,808.0548 −3,021.1576 −1,467.7955
Note: instrumented variable, “Number of police stations”. Instruments: distance to the nearest police sta-
tion and area population density. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, re-
spectively. Base: individual widowed, individual female, individual noneducation, individual unemployed,
household neighborhood: fairly populated area, individual non-displaced due to war
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Three types of victimization have been considered, namely the probability of being
victimized of aggregated crime, that of larceny or burglaries, and the probability of
being victimized of assaults. Coefficients of significant variables are in bold charac-
ters. However, some of these explanatory variables may be related to one another.
To deal with this issue of multi-collinearity, a pairwise correlation matrix between
covariates has been generated. Table 14 indicates that even though we may suspect
a correlation between variables that correlation is quite weak since it is not close to
1.00, and does not merely change the results of the regression. The analysis of our
findings is related to the identified groups of variables.
Exposure to crime There is a positive relationship between the marital status and the
probability of being a victim of crime; but that result only holds for aggregate crime.
So, compared with widowed, being single, or married increases the probability of
victimization in the city of Abidjan. That result is consistent with that of Fougère
et al. (2007) in France, where exposition to crime is found to be more pronounced
for single individuals compared with married ones. In fact, even though our findings
indicate that single and married household heads are exposed to crime in Abidjan
city, that probability of victimization is greater for single individuals than married
ones.
However, even though we found no relationship between age and the likelihood
of victimization, gender appears as a significant determinant of victimization. In fact,
there is a positive and significant relationship between being male and exposure to
thefts (including larcenies and burglaries). This is in accordance with what is found
by Gomes and Paz (2005) in the city of São Paulo and the result of Barslund et
al. (2007) in Mozambique, where males are found to have a higher probability of
victimization of any type of crime than a female.
Lastly, in reference to employment status, the results reveal that the likelihood
of victimization of aggregate crime and assaults is higher for self-employed indi-
viduals compared with unemployed ones. Furthermore, while we found no effect
between being employed in a paid job and victimization, the significant impact of
self-employment on victimization of assaults is critical. In fact, self-employed indi-
viduals are likely to spend much more time in the street in the group of an active
population, which could increase their vulnerability to crime in the light of the theory
of routine activities of Cohen et al. (1981).
Attractiveness to crime shows that there is a significant linkage between income
per capita and the probability of being a given crime victim. Although we find a
positive relationship between income and the likelihood of victimization for aggre-
gate crime and assaults, we notice a negative impact of income on the victimization
of thefts. That result shows the ambiguous effect of income in the understanding of
criminal behavior. Firstly, the positive impact of income on victimization is consis-
tent with Barslund et al. (2007), Fajnzylber et al. (2001), and the economic theory of
crime developed by Becker (1968). It is clear that crime, namely property crime is ba-
sically motivated by the expected net returns; therefore, wealthy individuals are more
likely to be targeted. On the reverse, wealthier individuals can undertake a minimum
of deterrent investment (electronic protections, watchdogs, alarms, travel in private
cars, etc.) so to avoid some petty crimes such as larcenies Gaviria and Pages (2002).
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Proximity to crime There is also a positive relationship between the risk of becom-
ing a victim of any kind of crime (assault, theft, etc.) and education. But here, only
secondary and higher educations have a significant impact. This result seems related
to opportunity costs of crime, where highly educated individuals are expected to have
a higher level of income (human capital effect), therefore, to be more targeted by of-
fenders. Indeed in Abidjan, secondary and higher educational attainments are mostly
associated with middle class and richer households; they are consequently related to
higher probability of victimization. This result is consistent with Gaviria and Pages
(2002) who have shown that more educated people, from rich and middle classes are
more prone to be victims of crime.
Guardianship Even though it was expected that the size of household reduces the
risk of victimization, we found no relationship between that variable and the proba-
bility of victimization. However, there is a positive relationship, though weakly sig-
nificant, between the share of adults in the household and the probability of being the
victim of assaults. That result, though inconsistent with that of Barslund et al. (2007)
and that of Gomes and Paz (2005) where the number of adults in the household is a
source of security against burglaries, seems common sense. In fact, only adult house-
hold members are present in the labour market, and consequently are the ones who
are likely to have targeted durable goods (cars, for instance) subject to assaults.
Community variables are those relating to the neighbourhood, displaced house-
holds, and the number of police stations. Our findings show that the probability of
victimization of thefts, assaults, or aggregate crime significantly increases with the
fact of living in residential neighborhood compared with people living in densely
populated municipalities who are only exposed to thefts. Living in the municipali-
ties of Port-Bouet and Cocody exposes more to assaults than living in other munic-
ipalities. However, people living in the densely populated municipalities of Abobo,
Adjamé, and Attecoube have a higher probability of being victimized of larceny or
burglaries. That result suggests that larcenies and burglaries best fit densely populated
municipalities.
Risk of victimization of assaults in the sparsely populated municipality of Port-
Bouet is in accordance with the findings of Fafchamps and Minten (2005) in their
case study of Madagascar, where crime incidence is found to be positively related to
isolation. Also, the positive relationship between the probability of victimization of
assaults and living in the residential municipality of Cocody is consistent with the
economic theory of crime. In fact, Cocody is usually perceived as an area where a
good number of relatively wealthy people live in Abidjan.
The specificity of Côte d’Ivoire requires analyzing the effect of the political in-
stability on the likelihood of crime victimization. For that reason, we have checked
whether being forced to move to Abidjan exposes more to crime than urbanites usu-
ally residing in that city. We shall test the assumption that displaced people are not
truly integrated and supported by the community while in Abidjan, what makes them
more vulnerable to crime. We found that there is a positive and significant relation-
ship between having moved to Abidjan due to the civil war and exposure to crime,
particularly victimization of thefts. Intuitively, that result could be apprehended into
two ways. Firstly, it can be attributed to a data collection bias. In fact, the question-
naire has not clearly limited time of criminal experiments while reporting the data.
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Thus, individuals can live in Abidjan and report the loss they have encountered dur-
ing their displacement or before they arrived in the city of Abidjan. Secondly, being a
victim of war reinforces the vulnerability because of the insecurity caused by the lack
of housing or the lack of knowledge of risky areas, which makes them easier targets
for offenders.
Another important variable in the prevention of crime is the number of police sta-
tions in a given neighborhood. We found a negative and significant relationship be-
tween the probability of apprehension (number of police stations) and the probability
of victimization of aggregate crime and assaults. In accordance with the economic
theory of crime, risk of victimization is lowered by the presence of police resources.
While there is no significant link between the likelihood of victimization of thefts
(including larcenies and burglaries) and the number of police stations, the deterrent
effect of the probability of detection is found to be more pronounced for assaults than
for aggregate crime. That result is consistent with Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004)
in their inquiry on the impact of the massive presence of police officers on crime
incidence in Buenos Aires, that assaults, namely car assaults are found to be more
sensible in the presence of police officers than other crimes.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
The sensitivity analysis aims at understanding the impact of policy simulation on
crime victimization. We address this question by computing on the one hand the av-
erage predicted probability of crime victimization and on the other hand determining
the likelihood of victimization if some enforcement variables namely “individual in-
come” and “number of police stations” are set at a given threshold. More precisely,
we wanted to explore the risk of exposure to crime if the individual income is in-
creased by 10% or if the number of police stations is doubled.
Our findings indicate that the increase of the individual income by 10% increases
the average predicted probability of victimization by 1.6% and that of exposure to as-
saults by 4.9%. On the reverse, the increase of the individual income by 10% reduces
slightly the likelihood of victimization of larceny (by 0.023 per 1 million).
These findings are consistent with economic theory, showing the undetermined re-
lationship between income and exposure to crime. It is true that wealthier individuals
are mostly the main targets of economically motivated crimes, but it has also been
proven that they are the ones who can invest in private protection against property
offenses such as larcenies or thefts.
For that concern, the deterrence issue, the results indicate that a doubling of the
number of police stations reduces the likelihood of victimization by 15.6% and that of
the risk of being assaulted by 6.3%. It is clear that even though doubling the number
of police resources deters crime; the effect of such a policy differs from the type of
the offense we enforce. That result is also consistent with theory of crime, showing
that an increase in the number of police stations increases the aggregate probability
of detection, what reduces the likelihood of victimization. That finding is also in
accordance with some empirical results like that of Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004)
indicating that even though assault is very sensible to the presence of police resources,
mostly a certain time is required before the police be alerted after an attack, which
could reduce the effect of police stations on those categories of crime.
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5.4 Underreporting and crime enforcement: comparison between macro- and
micro-data
Our findings indicate the negative relationship between crime and the probability of
detection. In the two-stage regression, the probability of arrest is found to deter all
the different series of crime, namely thefts, aggravated assaults, homicides, and ag-
gregate crime. These results have been confirmed in the micro-data analysis. Except
for thefts, we show that any increase in the number of police stations (the probability
of apprehension), reduced the likelihood being victimized of assaults, and aggregate
crime. In the micro-data, the insignificant relationship between police resources and
victimization of larceny may be related to data limitation. That result may exhibit
the problem of underreporting of larcenies and indicate that only serious thefts are
reported to the police, since larcenies are not very sensible to the presence of police.
6 Conclusion
Our work is part of research on how to ensure an environment of stability and secu-
rity valuable for a post conflict economic development in Côte d’Ivoire. Our approach
has been to understand the effects of socio-economic and public policies on crime in
the district of Abidjan, the economic capital city of the country. Based on theoret-
ical models on the motivations to turn to crime, we have estimated a simultaneous
equations model of supply for offenses. Three types of offenses, namely aggravated
assault, homicide, theft and aggregate crime have been analyzed. To better under-
stand the incentives to criminal behavior and to deal with the issue of underreporting,
another empirical investigation relating to the likelihood of victimization has been
tackled with an instrumented probit model.
Two sources of data are involved in this analysis. These are annual crime reports
from 1978 to 2007 from the Department of Statistics of the Criminal Police Division
and a survey relating to 1,600 households conducted in November 2006 in the city
of Abidjan. Hypotheses relating to the probability of apprehension, to the incidence
of inequality, to the illegal circulation of firearms, and to exogenous shocks such as
the devaluation of the regional currency (FCFA) in 1994, the military coup d’état in
1999, and the civil war in 2002 have been tested.
In accordance with the economic theory of crime, our findings point out that except
for aggravated assaults, the probability of arrest reduces the incidence of any type of
crime in Abidjan. Furthermore, at the micro-level, we have shown that doubling the
number of police stations reduces the likelihood of victimization of aggregate crime
by 15.6% and that of the risk of being assaulted by 6.3%.
As indicated in our assumptions and referencing to a good number of other em-
pirical findings, the effect of income is mixed. At the micro-level, the likelihood of
victimization of assaults is positively related to individual income while income neg-
atively impacts on the probability of being victimized of thefts. That finding exhibits
the key role of income in crime control policies. It shows that a sustained growth
of the GDP per capita is necessary but not enough to deter crime; reduction of in-
equalities does matter. Inequality, captured by the Gini concentration index in our
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simultaneous equation model, is significantly and positively related to thefts. We also
found that the likelihood of victimization increases with education. Individuals with
secondary and higher education levels are the most exposed to assaults and to aggre-
gate crime.
In addition, while the population size is found to deter any kind of crime at the
macro- level, the likelihood of victimization of assaults, thefts, and aggregate crime
is found to be positively associated with the neighborhood in micro-data. Precisely,
while the residential neighborhood is likely to be exposed to any type crime, a pop-
ulated neighborhood is likely only to increase victimization of thefts. This finding is
quiet obvious since it is in accordance with economic motivation of crime, making
residential areas the best targets of offenders where the expected return of crime is
higher than elsewhere.
As far as exogenous shocks are concerned, we have found that devaluation of
the CFA franc explains positively only aggravated assaults, while the military coup
d’état is found to have positively and significantly affected both aggravated assault
and aggregate crime. The effect of the civil war is mixed. On the one hand, we found
a positive and significant relationship between civil war and the incidence of thefts
or larcenies, and on the other hand a negative and significant relationship between
civil war and the prevalence of aggravated assaults and homicides. While the positive
impact of civil war on property crime could be associated with worsening economic
conditions consecutive to the conflict, the deterrent effect of the civil conflict on vi-
olent offenses could be linked to a temporary “crackdown” policing resulting from a
massive presence of armed forces in the streets.
Finally, in order to take into account the specificity of the case of Abidjan, two
variables have been included in the analysis: at the macro-level, we have checked
the effect of illegal firearms and at the micro-level the fact of being a displaced in-
dividual. We found that the proliferation of illegal light weapons has positively and
significantly influenced the incidence of aggravated assaults. Also, there is a positive
link between the probability of victimization and the fact of being displaced due to
the civil conflict.
From these findings, it appears that policies that are likely to perform economic
growth and inequality reduction and combined with those which are prone to increase
the probability of arrest need to be implemented. Particularly, to effectively control
crime in Abidjan, we suggest to:
– Increase police resources by equipping police forces with gears that cope with the
nature of violent crime.
– Increase the share of public investment in security.
– Increase the number of police stations.
– Accelerate the poverty reduction programs of the government so to reduce inequal-
ity.
– Intensify the control of light weapons proliferation.
In addition, for that policy to actually reduce illegal behavior, the issue of the quality
of the police resources needs to be addressed mainly in a framework of the lack of
democracy and high level of corruption.
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Appendix: Specification tests
A.1 Nakamura–Nakamura endogeneity test for the probability of apprehension
The Nakamura–Nakamura test can be performed to check whether a set of explana-
tory variables are endogenous. In our model, all the coefficients of the residual of the
first regression are significantly correlated to the dependant variable, indicating that
the probability of arrest is endogenous to crime rate.
Table 8 Results: test for endogeneity
Endogenous dependant variable
Homicides Assaults Thefts Aggregate crime
Coefficient of the residual of 1.098407** 0.0041383*** 2.001*** 1.359906***
the first equation
**significance at 5%, ***significance at 1%
A.2 Specification error test: the Ramsey reset test
H0: model has no omitted variables
Table 9 The Ramsey reset test
Variables: fitted values of
Thefts Assaults Homicides Aggregate crime
F(3,15) 0.45 0.23 0.66 0.14
Prob > F 0.7235 0.9924 0.5893 0.9724
From the respective probabilities (prob > F), we cannot reject the null hypothesis at the level of 10%
In conclusion, our econometric models of supply for offenses are well specified.
A.3 Normality tests
Table 10 Skewness/kurtosis tests for normality
Equation of supply for Variable Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) Joint
adj chi2(2) Prob>chi2
Assaults Residual 0.412 0.558 1.08 0.5817
Homicides Residual 0.161 0.544 1.03 0.5235
Thefts Residual 0.689 0.554 0.53 0.7674
Aggregate Crime Residual 0.529 0.681 0.59 0.7456
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The probabilities of the tests are respectively 0.58, 0.52, 0.76, and 0.74; we cannot
therefore reject the null hypothesis of normality of the error term of the different
equations of supply for offense.
A.4 Breusch–Pagan/Cook–Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
H0: Constant variance
Table 11 Results: Breusch–Pagan/Cook–Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Variables: fitted values of
Thefts Assaults Homicides Aggregate crime
chi2(1) 0.19 0.90 0.82 0.96
Prob > chi2 0.6621 0.3431 0.3654 0.3278
With the values of the probability (Prob > chi2), the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected.
A.5 Chow stability test
H0: stability of the coefficients in the two periods
Table 12 Results for the Chow stability tests
1994: devaluation 1999: coup d’état 2002: civil war
Assaults F(13, n-2*13) F(13, n-2*13) F(13, n-2*13)
0.01164324 0.00634295 0.00286143
Thefts F(13, n-2*13) F(13, n-2*13) F(13, n-2*13)
0.02428191 0.01410153 0.0019446
Homicides F(13, n-2*13) F(13, n-2*13) F(13, n-2*13)
0.00287397 0.00002654 0.00002361
Aggregate crime F(13, n-2*13) F(13, n-2*13) F(13, n-2*13)
0.26427835 0.11204641 0.00133399
The probability of the Chow test for each individual crime respectively for de-
valuation, coup d’état and civil war, indicates that the null hypothesis of stability of
the coefficient between the different subgroups can be rejected. In conclusion, these
exogenous shocks have affected the incidence of criminal activity in Abidjan.
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A.6 Exogeneity test for an explanatory variable: illegal firearms
Table 13 Correlation between the residual and illegal firearms
First difference illegal firearms Coefficient Std. Err. t P > |t |
First difference model residual −0.1496203 0.1627234 −0.92 0.366
Thefts
First difference model residual 0.250132 0.1974729 1.27 0.216
Homicides
First difference model residual 0.0670418 0.1393154 0.48 0.634
Aggravated assaults
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